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VARA TURNS THIRTY-ONE: HOW AMENDING THE VISUAL
ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990 TO ADD GUIDING LANGUAGE CAN
FURTHER ADVANCE THE ACT’S PURPOSE
Ana-Victoria Moreno†
Abstract
Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”) in 1990,
introducing the doctrine of moral rights into United States law.1 Moral
rights consist of four rights: attribution, disclosure, withdrawal, and
integrity.2 VARA recognizes the rights of attribution and integrity to
preserve the integrity of artworks and of the country’s cultural heritage by encouraging artists to create.3 The passing of VARA has been
met with criticism4 but also with excitement that Congress recognized
the importance of artists’ non-economic rights.5 In the thirty-one years
since the enactment of VARA, caselaw has developed that shows how
courts and parties are interpreting its language.6 One main issue with
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V8.I2.3
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1. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990,
14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 478 (1990).
2. Michael Rushton, The Moral Rights of Artists: Droit Moral ou Droit Pécuniaire?, 22 J. CULTURAL ECON. 15, 15 (1998).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 14 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6924.
4. See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 795, 811 (2001).
5. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 16 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6926 (noting that artists’ rights are separate from economic rights).
6. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY:
EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 61 (2019), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HE5-VPAG].
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VARA as written is that there is a lack of guidance in interpreting the
standards, which has created some judicial confusion.7 If Congress
were to amend VARA to provide more guiding language, it would give
courts a clear and detailed framework when interpreting it. While
some degree of flexibility must be maintained, additional guiding language would further promote VARA’s purpose and ensures fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 104
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I. INTRODUCTION
“An artist’s professional and personal identity is embodied in
each work created by that artist . . . . It is a rebuke to the dignity of the
visual artist that our copyright law allows distortion, modification, and
even outright permanent destruction of such efforts.”8 John Koegel,
7. See id. at 77.
8. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6925.
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who represented various artistic interests and testified before Congress
during the creation of the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), illustrates in this statement how failure to recognize the non-economic interests of an artist strips artists of their dignity. Immanuel Kant, whose
ideologies helped shape French law, defended copyright based on the
importance of recognizing that a creation was essentially an extension
of the artist and required protections that went beyond a compensatory
basis.9 This ideology gave rise to the moral rights doctrine, which essentially gives artists non-economic rights to protect their works from
destruction.10
The Berne Convention, signed in 1886 by an organization of
countries seeking international copyright protection, adopted four previously recognized moral rights in 1928.11 The United States joined
the Berne Convention in 1989 after thorough consideration of whether
joining the Convention would require the United States to pass new
laws to protect moral rights.12 Because moral rights are inherently at
odds with the economic foundation of U.S. copyright law,13 the country approached adherence to the Berne Convention with a minimalist
approach, only making minimal changes to existing U.S. law to
achieve a basic level of Berne compatibility.14 VARA, the first introduction of moral rights into U.S. law, brings the U.S. into greater harmony with the Berne Convention’s recognition of moral rights15 by
recognizing two out of the four moral rights.16 As thirty-one years
have passed since enactment, a review and analysis are due to see
whether VARA is furthering its legislative purpose.

9. Rushton, supra note 2, at 17.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 16.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6917.
13. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990) (stating
that the U.S. Constitution’s copyright clause makes the public’s interest at least
equal, if not superior, to the author’s interest and encourages the maximization of
“production of and access to intellectual creations.”).
14. Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later:
The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 6 (1989).
15. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 10 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6920.
16. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 14, at 27.
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The introduction of VARA in 1990 showed the United States’
commitment to recognizing moral rights17—to some extent. It is an
exciting possibility to see how Congress and courts will continue to
shape the moral rights framework to fit within fundamental U.S. legal
principles. This Comment suggests that Congress should amend
VARA to include certain language recommended by the U.S. Copyright Office. This language is based on the California Art Preservation
Act and provides guidance to courts in making a “recognized stature”
determination, which VARA requires for certain types of harm to be
actionable.18 If the California Art Preservation Act language is federalized, Congress should further define the meaning of “relevant community.” These amendments would bolster VARA’s effectiveness by
resolving some tension in the courts and providing artists basic fairness. A discussion promoting VARA would be incomplete without
addressing some criticisms of it. Thus, this Comment covers three
prominent critiques of VARA: the tension with the First Amendment,
the encouragement that courts undertake aesthetic interpretation when
analyzing the recognized stature standard, and the tension with property rights.19 While these critiques are important to consider, they
should not be used as a basis for completely discounting moral rights.
Additionally, this Comment explores the most recent and prevalent
VARA litigation, Castillo et al. v. G&M Realty, L.P., (commonly
known as “5Pointz”), to illustrate how VARA can protect artists.20 As
this Comment will show, the suggested approach of adding clarifying
language to recognized stature and “relevant community” would further ensure fair and accurate protection of artists’ moral rights.
Section II provides chronological historical background to
VARA by tracing the origins of moral rights in France and Germany.
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 10 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6920.
18. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 6, at 5, 68.
19. See infra Section III. See generally Dana L. Burton, Artists’ Moral Rights:
Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 639 (1995); Matt
Williams, Balancing Free Speech Interests: The Traditional Contours of Copyright
Protection and the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 105 (2005);
Claire Leonard, Copyright, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: The Problems
of Integrity and Compulsory Speech, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 293 (2012); Amy M.
Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263 (2009).
20. 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020); Louise Carron, Case Review of the 5Pointz
Appeal, CTR. FOR ART L. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://itsartlaw.org/2020/03/02/case-review-castillo-et-al-v-gm-realty-l-p/ [https://perma.cc/ST2M-BDCL].
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It then covers the creation of the Berne Convention and the developments it achieved through the twentieth century. This section explains
the introduction of moral rights to United States’ copyright law. First,
it analyzes why the United States was not originally in the Berne Convention. Then, it covers how moral rights differ significantly from
United States copyright law and what factors led the United States to
eventually adopt moral rights by passing VARA.
Section III highlights First Amendment constitutional issues
and interpretation issues that have come up since VARA was enacted.
The section covers three particular interpretation issues: two dealing
with the interpretation of the recognized stature standard and one dealing with aesthetic interpretation. Section IV argues Congress should
amend VARA to include clarifying language for the recognized stature standard as recommended by the U.S. Copyright Office and should
further clarify the term “relevant community.” It starts by elaborating
on the U.S. Copyright Office’s report on VARA from 2019. It then
covers the 5Pointz litigation as an example of VARA serving an important public interest and addresses the tension between VARA and
property rights. Lastly, this section concludes that amending the language as suggested would further Congress’ goals and briefly covers
the implication of the Supreme Court’s denial of the 5Pointz defendant’s petition.
II. HISTORY LEADING TO THE UNITED STATES’ ENACTMENT OF THE
VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990
A. Origins of the “Droit Morale” or Moral Rights
The invention of the printing press gave booksellers the ability
to quickly duplicate authors’ manuscripts, which up until that time
took far longer.21 Unfortunately, this invention gave rise to pirate
booksellers who could simply copy manuscripts already published by
the legitimate booksellers and sell them for much lower prices.22 It
became clear that legal protection was necessary because authors and
legitimate booksellers were left with no legal recourse against the pirate booksellers exploiting their work.23 Originally, the legitimate
21. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (1988).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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booksellers took the lead by securing protection in the form of a “privilege.”24 This privilege gave booksellers the exclusive right to print
and sell a specific author’s manuscripts for a limited time.25 This privilege system lasted for two hundred years but eventually dissipated
because booksellers were taking advantage of their power, governments matured so there was less need for censorship, and authors became more active in lobbying for their own protection.26 A statutory
form of protection replaced the privilege system.27
The statutory protection was the first instance where protection
for creative works was based on the rights of authors; this began the
philosophical debate of economic interests versus natural rights.28 Because the booksellers were not the creators of the work, they had a
purely economic interest. On the other hand, the ideas behind the
works belonged to the authors who created those works. Philosophers
used natural law as the basis for arguing that an author’s economic and
personal interests should both be protected.29 Great Britain and the
United States partially rejected this natural rights approach.30 Statutes
developed in both countries that gave authors an exclusive, but timelimited, right to prevent others from copying their work without their
authorization to protect the economic rights of authors and publishers.31 In contrast, the natural rights approach was adopted by continental Europe, which allowed authors to retain rights even if they alienated their economic rights by selling the rights to a publisher.32 These
became known as “moral rights.”
Continental European copyright theory recognizes droit d’auteur—the right of the author to have moral and economic rights in their
works.33 In a landmark French case, the sculptor, Clesinger, brought
an action against transferees of a statue he had created that the transferees mutilated.34 The court stated that independent of any economic
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4–5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353,
360 (2006).
34. Rushton, supra note 2, at 17.
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interest in a work, an artist held a more precious interest—that of his
reputation.35 This case, as well as the ideologies underpinning droit
d’auteur, show the concerns of ethics and justice in going beyond the
mere economic interest of an author.36
The ideology of moral rights developed in France and Germany in the 19th century.37 The moral rights doctrine encompasses
four separate rights.38 These four separate rights are as follows:
(1) attribution or paternity—the right to be identified as the
creator of a work, to use a pseudonym, or to remain anonymous; (2) integrity—the right to protect against alteration or
mutilation of a work; (3) disclosure—the right to publish or
not to publish a work; and (4) withdrawal—the right to remove a work from circulation.39
Through the latter part of the 19th century, the French civil
courts recognized each of these rights.40 In 1901, France’s highest
court recognized those rights as well. 41 Fast-forward to modern times
and moral rights are now embedded in French and German copyright
statutes.42 The decision to include moral rights within copyright statutes was not arbitrary.43 Moral rights, similar to economic rights, are
rights in copyrightable works.44 Thus, the copyright statutes in both
France and Germany recognize “two attributes and objectives of copyright protection: one moral and the other economic.”45 Two of the
rights that make up the larger doctrine of moral rights recognized in
France and Germany would eventually be recognized in the Berne
Convention of 1928.46

35. Id.
36. Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and
French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 432 (1999).
37. Rushton, supra note 2, at 16.
38. Peeler, supra note 36, at 426.
39. Rushton, supra note 2, at 16.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id.
42. Rigamonti, supra note 33, at 360.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Rushton, supra note 2, at 17.
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B. The Creation and Accomplishments of the Berne Convention
In the late 19th century, the idea of international protection for
the rights of authors gained momentum in Europe.47 The development
of copyright and the focus on authors’ rights made authors an influential-political group.48 In 1858, the first international Congress of Authors and Artists met in Brussels.49 The group served as the foundation
for the drafting and signing of the Berne Convention.50 Following a
few meetings of the Congress, a new International Association, initially comprised only of authors, called a meeting in 1883 to create a
union for the protection of literary property.51 Subsequent meetings
were held in 1884, 1885, and 1886.52 In 1886, ten countries singed the
Berne Convention drafted in 1885, which was then ratified in 1887.53
The ratification of the Berne Convention was a significant step toward
international copyright protection for authors and artists.54 It also provided a middle ground for countries that preferred common law legislation by including provisions preserving the application of national
law.55 National treatment continues to be a guiding principle of the
Berne Convention.56 This principle calls for reciprocal treatment by
requiring that Berne signatories give authors and artists who are nationals of other Berne countries the same protection they give to their
own nationals.57
A statement of moral rights came into the Berne Convention
in 1928,58 when 36 country members met in Rome.59 While a growing
membership was positive, it also made unanimous decisions much
more difficult to reach.60 The 1928 revisions increased the number of
works protected, added to the number of exclusive rights, and limited

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Burger, supra note 21, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
Rushton, supra note 2, at 16.
Burger, supra note 21, at 27.
Id.
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the use of reservations.61 Moral rights were one of the two new exclusive rights added at this Convention.62 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention recognized the author had “the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”63 In line with the doctrine of moral rights more broadly, the Article recognized that these
rights were inalienable and independent from the author’s economic
rights.64 While the Berne Convention also included the rights of paternity and integrity, the rights of disclosure or withdrawal were not included.65 As part of the introduction of moral rights into the Berne
Convention, each contracting state could decide how exactly the required moral rights would fit within each state’s domestic legislative
framework.66 Specifically, Article 6bis of the Rome revision stated “the
determination of the conditions under which these rights shall be exercised is reserved for the national legislation of the countries of the
Union.”67 This was an important revision for member countries like
Great Britain, who did not recognize moral rights under their copyright law, and instead assured the other members that they offered protection of moral rights under common law or alternative legislation.68
Moral rights under the Berne Convention strengthened in the
20th century. In 1948, the Brussels Convention added a revision that
contracting states ought to recognize moral rights after the death of the
author.69 However, this revision was somewhat insignificant because
the conference could not require contracting countries to do so as some
countries, like Great Britain, did not protect moral rights under the
country’s copyright law.70 Therefore, each contracting country could
decide to extend moral rights past the author’s life.71 In 1971, the conference made it mandatory for contracting countries to recognize an
61. Id.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Rushton, supra note 2, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Burger, supra note 21, at 28.
67. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis,
Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217.
68. Burger, supra note 21, at 32.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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author’s moral rights after death for at least the duration of the protection of the author’s economic right.72 However, there was still an exception for countries that did not recognize moral rights in their domestic law.73
C. Introduction of Moral Rights into the United States
1. Why the United States did not initially participate in the Berne
Convention
Early on, the United States and the majority of Berne Convention member countries differed greatly in their approach to copyright.74 First, the United States had no participation in any major-multilateral-copyright convention until the 1950s.75 U.S. copyright law
fell below some of the minimal protections imposed by the Berne Convention.76 For example, the Berne Convention set a minimum duration
of copyright protection of 50 years, but in the U.S., copyrights were
only viable for 28 years.77 Moral rights were another significant difference between U.S. copyright law and the post-1928 Berne Convention.78 The inclusion of Article 6bis became a major obstacle to American participation in the Berne Convention.79 In 1955, the United
States joined the first major international copyright convention, the
Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), which was more akin to U.S.
law,80 focusing on economic rights while excluding moral rights.
However, the UCC had limited international acceptance and was more
of a temporary solution rather than a leading international copyright
agreement.81

72. Id. at 46.
73. Id. at 33.
74. Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 75 (1988).
75. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 14, at 2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Lee, supra note 4, at 805.
80. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 14, at 2–3.
81. MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY 139 (2011).
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2. How Moral Rights Differ from Traditional U.S. Copyright Law
United States’ copyright law and moral rights differ in their
guiding principles of copyright law regarding economic interests.
While in France, the guiding copyright principle is to protect the pecuniary and personality rights of the artist, the United States’ guiding
copyright principle is that the artist or copyright owner is granted “economically exploitable rights to encourage the artist to create and to
enrich society.”82 This is rooted in the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the United States Constitution, which states that Congress has the
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”83 By emphasizing the importance of progress and usefulness, the clause arguably determines
that the nation’s guiding copyright principle is to enrich society. As a
result, civil law countries have had to achieve economic objectives
within the constraints of moral rights, whereas common law countries
have not.84
Scholars have long expressed concerns that moral rights would
threaten longstanding business and commercial arrangements.85 U.S.
copyright law “is an economic privilege designed to serve the public
interest, rather than an entitlement arising from the fact of creation.”86
It is clear that U.S. copyright law focuses on the economic interest and
commercialism of works because the law places emphasis on the commercial exploitation of information.87 In a way, “American copyright
law is an engine of the free market” where a monopoly is permitted
only as it “promote[s] the progress of science and useful arts.”88 Some
scholars explain this difference as due to the historical development of
82. Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 361, 362 (1998).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
84. Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 230 (1995).
85. Lee, supra note 4, at 812.
86. Swack, supra note 82, at 362 (quoting Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions
and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9 (1994)).
87. Margaret Ann Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami, The Author as Agent of Information Policy: The Relationship Between Economic and Moral Rights in Copyright, 26 GOV’T INFO. Q. 321, 330 (2009).
88. RAJAN, supra note 81, at 138.
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European countries versus the United States. As a new nation, the
United States dedicated most of its time to commerce and the pursuit
of economic prosperity to thrive as a nation.89 On the other hand, upper
- and middle-class Europeans could spend more time “enjoying, promoting, and purchasing art.”90 This historical context provides support
for diverging developments in copyright law, specifically concerning
the United States and moral rights.
Part and parcel of the economic differences between moral
rights and U.S. copyright law is the transfer of ownership. The framework of U.S. copyright law did not recognize an artist’s ability to retain continuing rights in their work after a transfer of ownership.91 This
is considerably in opposition with the inclusion of any moral rights,
which attach to the artist and their work and are inalienable. While
U.S. courts had an opportunity to address an artist’s non-economic
rights, caselaw reflects that the judiciary categorized such rights as
uniquely foreign and relied on existing American law to provide
equivalent rights.92 For example, in Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., an early
case dealing with moral rights, the court noted that “what are called
‘moral rights’ of the author is the law of foreign countries.”93 In Vargas, the illustrator Alberto Vargas brought a suit under contract law
against Esquire Magazine, who continued to publish Vargas’ illustrations after canceling his contract.94 Originally, the illustrations were
each published as a “Varga girl” but upon cancelation of the contract,
Esquire published each illustration as an “Esquire girl.”95 In addition
to the “Varga girl” title, all the pictures Vargas provided to Esquire
were published with his name until Esquire began publishing the pictures at issue.96 Vargas argued that the publication of his work constituted false attribution of authorship because it no longer credited him
as the creator.97 The court relied on the standard-form contract that
Vargas had signed with Esquire, which granted Esquire the perpetual
89. Swack, supra note 82, at 382.
90. Id. at 381–82.
91. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 96 (1997).
92. Lee, supra note 4, at 806.
93. Id. (quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947)).
94. Swack, supra note 82, at 384.
95. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 524; Swack, supra note 82, at 384.
96. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 524.
97. Swack, supra note 82, at 384.
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and exclusive right to the images, so the court found the contract had
divested Vargas “of all title, claim and interest in such drawings and
designs.”98
In another case, Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, artist
Alfred Crimi signed a contract with a church to paint a 26 by 35-foot
mural inside the church.99 Eight years after completing his work, the
church painted over the entire mural.100 Crimi brought a suit but the
court, echoing the Vargas court, stated that based on the contract,
Crimi had no cause of action because he contracted away all his rights
by agreeing that once the mural was on the wall, it would become part
of the church building and the copyright assigned to the owner (the
church).101
Commentators have pointed out that artists can secure the right
of integrity and attribution to their works under U.S. contract law.102
However, the above cases show that contract law is not exactly analogous to the moral rights protections from Article 6bis of the Berne Convention because it is extraordinarily easy to contract away an artist’s
rights in their work, as seen in the Vargas and Crimi transfer of ownership contract provisions. This puts artists in a particularly difficult
position due to a lack of bargaining power. Their goal is to get commissions and put their work out in the world, so they are often forced
to agree to certain contract terms they would not otherwise agree to in
order to secure a commission.103 They can either agree to a term like
the one in Vargas or in Crimi, or they can lose out on a commission.
Both the Vargas and Crimi courts mentioned that while the concept of
moral rights was recognized in civil law countries, the United States
had yet to accept the concept.104 Because the courts disposed of the
98. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 525–26 (“[T]he plaintiff by plain and unambiguous language completely divested himself of every vestige of title and ownership of the
pictures, as well as the right to their possession, control, and use.”).
99. 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1949); Swack, supra note 82, at 385.
100. Swack, supra note 82, at 385.
101. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814; Swack, supra note 82, at 385.
102. Lee, supra note 4, at 807.
103. See generally The Biggest Challenges Artists Face During Their Career,
ARTWORK ARCHIVE, https://www.artworkarchive.com/blog/the-biggest-challengesartists-face-during-their-career [https://perma.cc/K5DJ-E77B] (explaining that
when the artist got a commission for the show Billions, she did not charge the amount
that actually reflected her time because she likely would not have gotten the commission if she did).
104. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi, 89
N.Y.S.2d at 818.
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moral rights claims, the artists would have a much stronger cause of
action now that the United States has recognized some moral rights
under VARA. Thus, contract law is not analogous to the protection
offered by the Berne Convention.
3. Factors that Led the United States to Adopt Moral Rights
By the 1980s, the United States not having ratified the Berne
Convention began to yield complications.105 U.S. industries that depended in part on copyright to generate revenue had to use an indirect
“back door” method to achieve Berne-like protections, which was
costly.106 This involved concurrently publishing copyrightable works
in a Berne country to alter the work’s country of origin.107 Additionally, non-membership raised some concerns with trading partners.108
If the United States “advocated a high level of copyright protection
and enforcement” by trading partners, how come the country was “not
a member of the most protective multilateral copyright treaty?”109 By
the 1980s, adopting the Berne Convention was crucial for the United
States to become a leader in international copyright.110 This was primarily due to the fact that Berne membership was a prerequisite before
a country could adopt the much broader trade protections set out in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(“TRIPs”), administered by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”).111 The United States negotiated TRIPs with the country’s
trading partners.112 Additionally, in 1984, the United States withdrew
from the United Nations Educations, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), which administered the UCC, so the country lost
significant prestige within the treaty organization.113 And there was
also urgency in protecting copyrighted intellectual property from pirating in Asia.114 All these forces eventually led President Reagan to
sign legislation in 1989, which Congress had unanimously approved,
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 14, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
RAJAN, supra note 81, at 139.
Id.
Id.
Swack, supra note 82, at 383.
Id.
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bringing U.S. law into compliance with the Berne Convention.115 As
a result, the United States claimed that U.S. law could provide minimal
protections for artists’ moral rights as required by the Convention and
noted further that other member countries were not entirely in compliance; none of the other members objected.116
Through the VARA, Congress included moral rights within
U.S. copyright law,117 doing so for the purpose of preserving artwork.
Representative Edward Markey, a sponsor of the legislation, stated:
“[a]rtists in this country play a very important role in capturing the
essence of the culture and recording it for future generations.”118 The
codification of VARA lays out the rights of certain authors to two
moral rights: attribution and integrity.119 Under the right of attribution,
an author of a work of visual art has the right to claim authorship of
the work and prevent the use of their name as the author of any work
of visual art which they did not create.120 The right of integrity provides that an author of a work of visual art can also prevent the use of
their name as the author in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work that would be prejudicial to the author’s reputation.121 Integrity also extends to protect against any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work that would be
prejudicial to the author’s reputation and to prevent any destruction of
a work of recognized stature.122
The application of these rights is limited in part by defining a
“work of visual art” as a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture existing
in a single copy in a limited edition of two hundred copies or fewer
that are signed and numbered by the author.123 The definition also excludes specific works such as a work made for hire and audiovisual
works.124 VARA’s narrowness seems to attempt to alleviate some
nervousness that major interest groups such as periodical publishers
115. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 14, at 1.
116. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 91, at 97.
117. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 478.
118. Susanna Frederick Fischer, Who’s the Vandal? The Recent Controversy Over
the Destruction of 5Pointz and How Much Protection Does Moral Rights Law Give
to Authorized Aerosol Art?, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 326, 339 (2015).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
120. § 106A(a)(1)(A)–(B).
121. § 106A(a)(2).
122. § 106A(a)(3).
123. § 101.
124. Id.
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and motion picture producers might have about exposure to moral
rights claims when artists create contributions to their publications and
films.125 Further, VARA limits coverage to objects of art rather than
objects of mass production.126 VARA also allows an artist to waive
the integrity and attribution rights via a written instrument signed by
the artist that specifically identifies the work and the uses of that
work.127 Proponents of moral rights in the U.S. find that the waiver
provision is favorable for two reasons: it is in accordance with Article
6bis of the Berne Convention because Article 6bis does not directly prohibit waivers, and by requiring specificity, the waiver provision respects moral rights while allowing flexibility for other owners (copyright holders).128
The moral rights recognized in VARA are not completely
equivalent to those in the Berne Article 6bis.129 The three main differences include the duration of the moral rights, the distinction of intentional distortion, and the limited scope.130 As mentioned above, the
Berne Convention recognizes moral rights past the artist’s lifetime, but
for works created in the U.S. under VARA, the rights expire upon the
artist’s death.131 Another interesting distinction is that the wording of
VARA limits protection for intentional distortion or mutilation,
whereas the Berne Article is not limited to intentional acts.132 Lastly,
VARA only covers works of visual art,133 while the moral rights laws
of other Berne member countries also encompass music, film, and
other performing arts. Some argue that because of these differences,
VARA is more of a halfway, patchwork approach that lacks legitimacy.134 But as Professor Justin Hughes mentions, “incremental improvement is better than none at all.”135

125. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 479–80.
126. Id. at 480.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
128. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 487–88.
129. Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 3
UTAH L. REV. 659, 671 (2007).
130. Id. at 671–72.
131. Id. at 672.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 673.
135. Id.
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III. CURRENT ISSUES WITH VARA
Although limited in scope, VARA has sparked intense criticism. Many believe that moral rights are incompatible with the American legal system.136 Concerns revolve around the idea that an artist’s
moral rights supersede the constitutionally based rights of those who
have property interests in the works allowing them to make alterations.137 As discussed, VARA is the first legislated introduction of
moral rights into American copyright law. While VARA is narrow in
its application and seems to consider the rights of property owners,
critics nonetheless believe that the law should not treat art uniquely by
recognizing non-economic rights.138 Rather art should be treated based
on common-law rules of property and contracts because these rules
are fundamental to the United States’ legal system.139 This tension has
led to criticism of VARA based on constitutional and interpretation
issues.
A. First Amendment Constitutional Issues
Commentators have raised the argument that VARA violates
the First Amendment because it impedes an owner of artwork of recognized stature from destroying, mutilating, or modifying the artwork.140 Freedom of speech encompasses a broad range of expression,141 so any act of destruction, mutilation, or modification could fall
under protected speech. The First Amendment protects both a creator’s and other individuals’ rights to communicate.142 In sum, creators
are free to create, but the public is free to comment and criticize
through words and expressive acts.143 This is where VARA and the
First Amendment conflict because VARA prohibits the modification
of an artwork, but such modification could be constitutionally protected expression.

136. Lee, supra note 4, at 811.
137. Id. at 814.
138. Id.
139. Drew Thornley, The Visual Artists Rights Act’s “Recognized Stature” Provision: A Case for Repeal, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 363 (2019).
140. See id. at n. 70.
141. Kathryn Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 239 (1994).
142. Id. at 212–23.
143. Id. at 213.
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Copyright law generally implicates competing First Amendment rights. There are the rights of creators to speak freely, but there
are also important speech interests of secondary users.144 Scholars
since the 1970s have looked at the relationship between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act.145 How the First Amendment and
VARA will coexist is an ongoing concern. Some scholars argue that
the two simply cannot coexist. One has compared VARA’s conflict
with the First Amendment to the free-speech issues that arise from the
prohibition of the mutilation or destruction of the American flag.146
On the other hand, caselaw suggests that courts have not been
persuaded by defendants who assert their First Amendment rights in
infringement actions.147 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, the Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment defense to a copyright infringement claim.148 The Court found that First
Amendment protection was already embodied in the Copyright Act’s
Fair Use defense.149 While the fair use defense technically applies to
VARA because both are part of the Copyright Act, the House Report
accurately notes that such a defense would likely be unsuccessful.150
The works protected under VARA are original works in single or limited editions of two hundred copies.151 Allowing destruction or alteration of these works through fair use would disregard VARA’s core
purpose.152 A pattern has emerged where courts routinely reject First
Amendment defenses to copyright infringement claims.153 For example, the Fifth Circuit has recognized the tension between copyright law
and the First Amendment but noted that “the First Amendment is not
a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual

144. Claire Leonard, Copyright, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: The
Problem of Integrity and Compulsory Speech, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 293, 315
(2012).
145. Matt Williams, Balancing Free Speech Interests: The Traditional Contours
of Copyright Protection and the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
105, 105 (2005).
146. Id. at 127.
147. Kelly, supra note 141, at 236.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 243.
151. Id. at 244.
152. Id.
153. Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair
Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 115 (1996).
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property.”154 While it seems a majority of scholars argue that VARA
violates the First Amendment, there is some scholarship offering alternative arguments and solutions.
One scholar proposes a right of integrity based on due process
that only requires notice to the first creator and a meaningful opportunity for the creator to object to the alteration of their work.155 In
some ways, VARA already incorporates this due process in 17 U.S.C.
§ 113 by setting out limitations on an artist’s moral rights when the
work of art is part of a building.156 The limitations apply when the
owner of a building wants to remove a work of visual art that is a part
of their building, and the removal would not destroy the work.157 In
this situation, the artist’s moral rights do not apply if the owner makes
a diligent, good faith attempt, without success, to notify the artist of
the intended action or the owner did provide notice in writing, and the
artist failed, within 90 days, to remove the work.158 The drafting of
VARA has demonstrated a strong congressional concern in balancing
these conflicting interests.
B. Interpretation Issues
As courts apply VARA, two key interpretation issues have developed: the interpretation of the recognized stature standard and the
aesthetic interpretation required by VARA.
1. Recognized Stature & Honor or Reputation: Different or
Interrelated Concepts?
One of the most discussed VARA interpretation issues is the
definition of recognized stature because Congress did not include a
definition or guidance on the interpretation of how to analyze whether
a work has achieved recognized stature. The pertinent language as
stated in VARA is as follows: “the author of a work of visual art . . .
shall have the right to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that

154. Id. (quoting Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1184, 1187–88 (5th Cir. 1979)).
155. Leonard, supra note 144, at 318.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)–(2).
157. Id.
158. § 113(d)(2)(A)–(B).
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work is a violation of that right.”159 Additionally, VARA gives an artist “the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work . . . in the event of a distortion . . . of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” and the artist has the
right to prevent any destruction of their work which would be prejudicial to their honor or reputation.160 At first glance, it seems the recognized stature analysis should focus on the work itself, specifically
whether the work has attained recognized stature, and the honor or
reputation analysis should focus on the author. But these concepts are
inevitably related. For example, if a new Jeff Koons work was discovered, would a court have to conclude that it did not fall under VARA
protection because the work itself had not attained recognized stature
on its own merits? Or would this new work automatically have recognized stature because the author is world-renowned? By the same token, can a less well-known artist seek to enforce their VARA rights
under the claim that the destruction of their work harmed their honor
or reputation, even if the work itself is remarkable? In developing the
standard of recognized stature, courts have wrestled with the interplay
of the artist and their work.
In Scott v. Dixon, the court makes clear that the recognized
stature analysis must focus on the artwork in question and whether the
artwork has acquired recognized stature.161 But immediately following this statement, the court recognizes that there might be situations
where the artist’s body of works as a whole has acquired recognized
stature, so any work by that artist would fall under the scope of
VARA.162 This analysis is echoed by the court in Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., where the court noted that caselaw reflects a variety of methods to determine recognized stature in concluding there is a legal basis
for the plaintiffs’ method of inferring recognized stature of the work
based on the author’s reputation.163
The interrelatedness of recognized stature and honor or reputation is further exemplified in VARA’s legislative history. The House
159. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
160. § 106A(a)(2), (3)(a).
161. Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
162. Id. (“For example, the court would be hard pressed to hold that a newly discovered Picasso is not within the scope of VARA simply because it has not been
reviewed by the experts in the art community.”).
163. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., No. 13-CV-05612, 2017 WL 1208416, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017).
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Report for 106A Sections 3(A) and (B), which grants an artist the
right to prevent the intentional destruction of a work that would be
prejudicial to their honor or reputation and of a work of recognized
stature,164 focuses on the honor or reputation standard required by the
Berne Convention.165 Further, the report mentions the Committee’s
deletion of a per se standard for analyzing recognized stature.166 The
Committee recognized the need for flexibility in interpreting the term
honor or reputation.167 It is clear that the legislators intended for
VARA to also protect less well-known or renowned artists.168 The legislative history provides the following guidance when applying the
honor or reputation concept: “focus on the artistic or professional
honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the work that is
protected.”169 While it is clear that recognized stature applies to the
work and honor or reputation applies to the artist, the ways these concepts affect each other in the analysis is interesting. These nuances
seem to be an integral part of VARA and of the moral rights doctrine
due to the fundamental idea that an author’s identity is intrinsically
linked to and embodied by their work. It is a positive development to
see courts willing to recognize different legal bases for plaintiffs to
prove the recognized stature of their work because it ultimately serves
to advance VARA’s purpose “[to] protect[] both the reputations of
certain visual artists and the works of art they create.”170
2. Recognized Stature & Community
In analyzing whether a work attained recognized stature,
courts have also turned to the opinions of the community.171 To further
muddle the analysis of the recognized stature standard, the definition
of community has been left to interpretation.172 Who makes up the
164. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B).
165. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6917.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 5.
171. See Carter v. Helmsely-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
rev’d on other grounds.
172. See generally id. at 325 (concluding that whether a work is of recognized
stature depends on whether the work “is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members
of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society”).
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relevant community? A default answer is an academic community
where only the opinions of art critics, art professors and researchers,
curators, and other art experts would matter in determining whether a
work has attained recognized stature. But this idea has been met with
criticism by commentators who believe that confining the community
to only scholarly consensus is too narrow.173 Because there is no legislative guidance, courts are left to choose whether the plaintiff’s or
the defendant’s interpretation is the most persuasive.
A New York District Court in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear found
the recognized stature standard “is best viewed as a gate-keeping
mechanism—protection is afforded only to those works of art that art
experts, the art community, or society in general view as possessing
stature.”174 Therefore, the court defined community to include art experts, art community, and society in general. This articulation of the
requirement led to the Carter two-tiered test requiring a plaintiff to
show: (1) that the visual art has “stature” (i.e., is meritorious), and (2)
that this stature is recognized by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.175 While the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s holding
because the work in question qualified as a work made for hire, the
two-tiered test was affirmed on appeal.176
The evidence presented in Carter resulted in a battle of expert
witnesses. The plaintiffs in Carter were sculptors and artists.177 They
had a continuing contract with the owners of a building in New York
to design and install sculptures and other permanent installations in
the building lobby.178 The managing agent of the property changed
because the owner of the property changed.179 But the managing agent
always extended the contract with the plaintiffs.180 Eventually, the
owners of the property filed for bankruptcy and made statements to
the plaintiffs that led them to believe the defendants intended to alter
173. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 6, at 79.
174. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
175. Keshawn M. Harry, A Shattered Visage: The Fluctuation Problem with the
Recognized Stature Provision in the Visual Artists Rights Acts of 1990, 9 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 193, 198 (2001).
176. Id.
177. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 312.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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or remove the artwork.181 Based on expert testimony, the court concluded that the work was of recognized stature.182 Plaintiffs called art
professors and the president of the Municipal Art Society of New York
as their expert witnesses.183 In contrast, defendants called an art critic
who expressed disdain for contemporary art.184 The court weighed the
testimony of all the expert witnesses and found the art critic’s testimony was too colored by personal opinion and preferences, while the
plaintiff’s expert witnesses were more probative and thus persuasive.185 The way the Carter court defined community is extremely
broad because it includes art experts, the art community, which is in
and of itself not defined, and society as a whole. The parties’ witnesses
can thus be categorized into the art expert and art academia communities, which harkens back to the issue critics have with narrowly defining the term community to art experts.
Interestingly, VARA included guidance on recognized stature
when it was first introduced in 1989. It provided that “in determining
whether a work is of recognized stature, a court or other trier of fact
may take into account the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of
fine art, curators of art museums, conservators, and other persons involved with the creation, appreciation, history, or marketing of visual
art.”186 This is the per se standard mentioned above in the recognized
stature and honor or reputation section. This standard was eventually
deleted by the Committee. According to the Committee, the inclusion
of this standard would increase litigation by creating a battle of expert
witnesses.187 Unfortunately, Carter shows that what the Committee
feared is true even when VARA does not include the standard. Carter
quickly became a battle of expert witnesses between professors for
the plaintiffs and an art critic for the defendants.188 It seems natural
that parties will resort to expert testimony to prove that a work is or is
not of recognized stature because it is not otherwise clear how works
can qualify for recognized stature. The Carter test begins the
181. Id. at 313.
182. Id. at 324.
183. Id. at 325.
184. Id. at 326.
185. Id.
186. H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. § 106A(a)(3) (1989).
187. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6925.
188. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 314, 326.
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discussion of how community should be defined in the recognized
statue analysis.
3. Aesthetic Interpretation
VARA brings up an issue of aesthetic interpretation because it
requires courts to base decisions on aesthetic considerations.189 The
concerns about making an aesthetic judgment in law include courts
being ill-equipped to engage in this analysis, the issue of the subjective
and unpredictable nature of aesthetic judgments, and censorship.190 In
the seminal case about aesthetic judgment in the courts, Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographic Co., Justice Holmes stated that “it would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”191 This case gave rise to
the proposition that the artistry of a work should not serve as the foundation for copyright protection.192
Notwithstanding this proposition, aesthetic judgment is inextricably linked to copyright law.193 For example, courts exercise some
artistic judgment when assigning joint ownership to a copyright or
when determining the scope of copyright protection.194 Further, in
some instances, a statute may require a judicial determination of artistic merit.195 For example, in Bleistein, the statute Rev. Stat. Section
4952 at issue referred to “works connected with the fine arts.”196 This
is similar to VARA’s works of recognized stature because both statutes call for judicial determination of aesthetic interpretation to conclude whether the work before the court connects with the fine arts or
has recognized stature.197 VARA, like other copyright statutes,
189. See Christopher J. Robinson, The “Recognized Stature” Standard in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1965 (2000).
190. Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgement in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 446 (2017).
191. Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgements in
Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. L. REV. 343, 345
(2015).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 346.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 347.
196. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
197. See Walker & Depoorter, supra note 191, at 347 (“Moreover, in some instances a judicial determination of artistic merit and ontology is explicitly mandated
by the statute.”).
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requires judges and juries to undertake aesthetic interpretation of
works.198
VARA caselaw shows courts struggling to avoid aesthetic interpretation when determining if a work has recognized stature.199 In
Carter, the court emphasized that the inquiry is based on the opinion
of the artistic community and not on whether judges personally find
the work of art aesthetically pleasing.200 The Second Circuit echoed
this conclusion by noting that a district court’s finding that a banner at
issue in a VARA case was “visually appealing and demonstrated a
great deal of artistic ability and creativity” was irrelevant because
courts should avoid interpretations of VARA that require courts to assess the worth of a work of art.201 But passing aesthetic interpretation
on to the artistic community and society necessarily results in a battle
of expert witnesses during litigation, which ultimately puts the burden
on the courts to determine who is more credible.202 In making this determination, courts make aesthetic judgments to some degree.203
To avoid undertaking aesthetic interpretation, some courts adhered to the guidance of VARA’s two exclusions: promotional/advertising material and applied art.204 The Second Circuit determined that
if it could identify any promotional purpose, the work would be disqualified from VARA protection no matter the quality of the art.205
This is similar to the applied art exclusion, where courts decide cases
looking solely at a work’s usefulness, thus avoiding questions of status.206 There is clearly tension in the courts interpreting VARA to
avoid aesthetic interpretation while resolving battles of expert witnesses to conclude whether a work is of recognized stature.
Critics of VARA denounce its explicit call for judicial aesthetic interpretation, and some commentators find the recognized stature determination is unique within copyright law.207 However, scholars analyzing copyright law noted that there are other areas requiring
198. Id.
199. Soucek, supra note 190, at 443.
200. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d
on other grounds.
201. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 2003).
202. Soucek, supra note 190, at 444–45.
203. Id. at 445.
204. Id. at 443.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 445.
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courts to judge the parts of a work that are significant or the kinds of
transformations that reach a certain threshold of value where they fall
within the fair use defense.208 There is some degree of judicial aesthetic interpretation in many aspects of copyright law. As mentioned,
even in Bleistein, where Justice Holmes wrote his cautionary statement, the statute called for some judicial artistic judgment.209 In that
sense, VARA is not unique; however, Congress could alleviate the
concern by giving courts guidance with a clear framework for determining whether a work is of recognized stature.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The U.S. Copyright Office conducted a survey and created a
report in 2019 analyzing moral rights.
Although issues of interpretation persist, the introduction of
moral rights into U.S. copyright law through VARA helps protect the
country’s cultural heritage and diverse artistic community. In essence,
VARA serves two benefits to society: (1) enhancing the artistic, cultural heritage and (2) providing artists basic fairness by recognizing
and protecting their rights of authorship and preventing the destruction
of their works.210 While VARA has sparked intense criticism, it is a
step toward figuring out how U.S. copyright law might protect noneconomic interests. It is doubtful the United States would ever implement moral rights protection to the extent outlined in Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention because economics serves as the guiding principle
of U.S. copyright law. Additionally, any moral rights legislation will
likely need to align with other aspects of U.S. law developed with economic advancement as their aim. However, the scope of VARA seeks
to protect the rights of attribution and integrity of authors of works of
visual art.
Congress rooted the goal of VARA in promoting the public
interest by limiting the works of art covered by VARA to visual works
whose protection and preservation serve an important public policy.211
VARA shows legislative recognition of the benefit of moral rights and
208. Id.
209. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–52 (1903).
210. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6916–17.
211. Id. at 6916.
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the attempt to carve out some moral rights protection while adhering
to the economic foundations of U.S. law. For example, Congress carefully considered the exclusion of audiovisual works.212 While both artists of visual works of art and creators of films expressed concerns that
their works were being altered or used without their consent, Congress
considered the differences in the way these distinct creations are made
and distributed.213 Films are generally collaborative efforts and works
made for hire.214 Additionally, multitudes of copies are made of films,
and the rights are licensed to various entities to display the film.215
Thus, if one copy of a film is destroyed or altered, it can be replaced,
which is not the case with original works of visual art.216 Due to these
key differences, Congress excluded audiovisual works from VARA
protection because doing otherwise would highly interfere with the
American copyright system.217
In 2019, the U.S. Copyright Office conducted a study and published a report examining moral rights. In reviewing the results of a
moral rights symposium, the Copyright Office identified three principles to guide the analysis of U.S. moral rights: (1) the need to harmonize any proposals with precepts of U.S. law, like the First Amendment; (2) the need to acknowledge the critical importance of
attribution and integrity rights to authors; and (3) the importance of
recognizing that one size of moral rights protections cannot fit all industries.218 With these guiding principles in mind, the Copyright Office concluded that the existing patchwork of laws, supplemented by
changes recommended in the report, would address a number of concerns raised by commentators as the Copyright Office was developing
the report.219 The Copyright Office was not yet prepared to recommend the adoption of a new statutory moral right because of the significant changes to U.S. law that would represent.220 This stance supports the claim mentioned above that the U.S. is not likely to
implement a more comprehensive moral rights statute similar to
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 6921.
Id. at 6919.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 6, at 27.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 35–36.
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Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. But the recommendations suggested by the Copyright Office, if implemented, would further the
goals of VARA by offering more guidance to courts when interpreting
the recognized stature requirement.
The Copyright Office recommends that the standard of recognized stature should reflect that recognition of a work of art can originate from people in the geographic community where the art is located, or members of the general public who simply enjoy art—
regardless of their location or training.221 This extends the definition
of community beyond the opinions from the “fine arts” academy and
related scholarship.222 Specifically, the Office recommends adding the
following language from the California Art Preservation Act:
In determining whether a work of visual art is of recognized
stature, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists,
art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museum, and
other persons involved with the creation or marketing of art,
as well as the opinion of the relevant community.223
The addition of this language would help alleviate a few of the
issues of VARA, which this Comment will address in turn. First, this
language would give guidance to courts when determining whether a
work is of recognized stature. This language expands and solidifies the
second prong of the Carter two-tiered test defining community. Second, while a battle of experts seems unavoidable, this language would
help ensure that artists who create public art or works that do not have
an academic focus could still meet the standard. This language allows
courts to consider whether a work is of recognized stature within the
particular community where the art is located. This would also promote Congress’ appreciation that less well-known artists should also
be able to protect their honor or reputations. Third, by giving more
guidance to the courts, the language would help reduce judicial interpretation of aesthetics. There will still be some degree of aesthetic interpretation because the courts would have to conclude who among
the experts is more credible to determine which party would prevail.
However, as mentioned above and in addition to Justice Holmes’s
statement, there are degrees of aesthetic interpretation throughout

221. Id. at 80.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 80–81.
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copyright law. The addition of this language would help limit the degree of subjectivity or unpredictability of aesthetic interpretation.
While federalizing the California Art Preservation Act language is certainly a step toward providing courts a clearer framework
for the interpretation of VARA’s recognized stature standard, the language still leaves open the definition of “relevant community.” In
some ways, this allows the flexibility for parties bringing or defending
a VARA claim to propose who comprises the relevant community.
This flexibility can be useful to further VARA’s purpose because the
community will change depending on the work in question. But leaving the language as is could lead to unintended issues of fairness regarding the application of the language.
The prevailing definition of community comes from the Carter
two-tiered test that “stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.”224
However, the House Report for VARA states that courts interpreting
the statute use the “generally accepted standards of the artistic community.”225 By not providing additional guidelines, there is the potential for tension in the courts if they interpret the definition of community differently; some courts might include the opinions of society
more broadly, as suggested by the Carter test, and others might limit
it to the artistic community. For example, one interpretation of the
statute’s current form is that the “relevant community” language extends only to the relevant community of art experts because of the immediate context rule of statutory interpretation. The people listed before the relevant community includes artists, art dealers, collectors of
fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons involved in creating or marketing art. Using the immediate context rule, the relevant
art community would be limited to the unifying aspect of all the preceding words, which is distinct types of art experts. This interpretation
might be more in line with Congress’ guidance of using the accepted
standards of the artistic community. If Congress were to amend
VARA to include the California language, Congress should consider
expanding the definition of relevant community to leave a clear and
strong framework for the judiciary.
224. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d
on other grounds; Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999).
225. Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 600 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
101-514, at 11, 13).
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Any parameters added to the California language to further define the relevant community would have to balance the need for a clear
framework with the need for flexibility in interpretation. As mentioned, the relevant community can vary depending on the type of
art,226 but some constraints could be added as a consideration for
courts when interpreting relevant community. For example, a relevant
community could be defined geographically based on where the art is
located.227 A sculpture in the center of a small town might not be recognized nationwide or internationally, but it might be of extreme importance to the citizens of that small town. In such case, the townspeople should be considered part of the relevant community.
Social media could also play a large role in shaping the relevant community of a work.228 If a work has a million likes and comments on Instagram, then Instagram might be considered part of the
relevant community for that work and speak to its recognized stature.
This will become an increasingly crucial factor as the art world continues to operate with a more significant online presence due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.229 Overall, the relevant community should be
able to include regular, ordinary people who might not fit in the definition of the artistic community but who give a work recognized stature because they appreciate it, enjoy it, and have been touched by it.
Further, certain factors like geography and the internet should be
added to the language for consideration.

226. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 6, at 79. United States Copyright Office
(“[T]he less established the artist and less relevant their work is to scholarly research,
the more attention should be given to the community’s opinion and not necessarily
the expert’s . . .” ).
227. Id.
228. Blake Brittain, Protest Art Fate Tied to Obscure, Rarely Litigated Copyright
Law, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jul. 16, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/ip-law/protest-art-fate-tied-to-obscure-rarely-litigated-copyright-law
[https:/
/perma.cc/DN3N-X6M2]; Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 439
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the plaintiffs successfully showed their works achieved
recognized stature through the use of their Folios showing evidence of their 5Pointz
works in various media in additional to “social media buzz”).
229. Blake Brittain, Protest Art Fate Tied to Obscure, Rarely Litigated Copyright
Law, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jul. 16, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/ip-law/protest-art-fate-tied-to-obscure-rarely-litigated-copyright-law
[https:/
/perma.cc/DN3N-X6M2].
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B. VARA at Work: The 5Pointz Litigation
A recent case commonly known as 5Pointz propelled the discussion above.230 The key question in the litigation was whether certain works of visual art had achieved recognized stature and, if they
had, the value of the art.231 In 2002, the defendant enlisted the plaintiff,
a distinguished aerosol artist, to turn a warehouse the defendant owned
into an exhibition space for artists.232 The plaintiff and other artists
rented studio spaces in the warehouse and filled the walls with aerosol
art.233 Under the plaintiff’s supervision, the site became known as
5Pointz and evolved into a major global center for aerosol art, attracting thousands of daily visitors, numerous celebrities, and widespread
media coverage.234 In May 2013, the plaintiff learned the defendant
sought municipal approval to demolish 5Pointz and turn it into luxury
apartments.235 The plaintiff, along with numerous other 5Pointz artists, sued under VARA to prevent the destruction of the site.236 While
pending litigation, the defendant began to paint over the artworks, destroy the building at night, and refused the artist’s permission to recover any work that could be removed.237
The district court found that most of the works achieved recognized stature through the plaintiff’s “plethora of exhibits and credible testimony, including the testimony of a highly regarded expert.”238
In making this determination, the district court noted that “courts
should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic community in determining whether a particular work is of recognized stature.”239 The district court found issue with the defendant’s
expert witness because she applied an overly restrictive interpretation
230. Judge Upholds $6.7 Million Ruling for 5Pointz Graffiti Artists, CBS N.Y.
(Feb. 21, 2020, 4:14 PM), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2020/02/21/judge-upholds
-6-7-million-ruling-for-5pointz-graffiti-artists/ [https://perma.cc/N27F-PNN6]; NY
Court Approves $6.7M Award for 5Pointz Graffiti Artists Whose Work Was Destroyed, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 20, 2020, 11:16 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news
/local/ny-court-approves-6-7m-award-for-5pointz-graffiti-artists-whose-work-destroyed/2296684/ [https://perma.cc/W6TJ-4AFN].
231. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 163 (2nd Cir. 2020).
232. Id. at 162.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 163.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 167.
239. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
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of the recognized stature standard that essentially only protected
works deemed to be masterpieces.240 This harkens back to the battle
of experts in Carter because the district court ultimately found the
plaintiffs’ experts more credible than the defendant’s.241 The plaintiffs
called artists, art appraisers, a conservator, the president of an auction
house, and a curator as their expert witnesses.242 The defendant called
an art lawyer and an appraiser as his expert witnesses.243 The district
court was highly persuaded by the plaintiffs’ art appraiser and found
her testimony highly credible, whereas the district court found the defendant’s art lawyer used an unduly restrictive interpretation of recognized stature.244 This is another example, in addition to Carter, that
shows how a battle of experts is unavoidable.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the works were not of
recognized stature for an array of reasons but, most importantly, because a majority of the works were temporary and the artists were
aware of the potential that the building could be torn down.245 The
court noted that there is nothing in VARA that excludes temporary
artwork from attaining recognized stature and potentially falling
within the scope of VARA.246 Further, the court agreed with the district court’s explanation that VARA accounts for the possibility of art
embedded in buildings being destroyed.247 Under § 113(d), when art
is incorporated into a site such that removing it would destroy the artwork, the property owner is required to obtain a written agreement
signed by both the owner of the building and the artist specifying that
installation of the work may subject the work to destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal.248 If in
such a situation the art can be safely removed, then the property owner
is required to provide written notice of the planned demolition and allow the artist 90 days to remove the work or to pay for its removal.249
Because the defendant in this case did not have a written instrument
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 167 (2nd Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B)).
Id.
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and did not allow the artists to remove the artwork that could have
been safely removed, the defendant’s argument that the artists should
have known of the possibility that their work could get destroyed is
baseless.250 Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling.251
The 5Pointz litigation demonstrates the importance of clarifying the recognized stature language and exemplifies the way VARA
can balance property owners’ rights with artists’ moral rights. The evidence presented by both parties again demonstrates the typical battle
of expert witnesses that will undoubtedly occur in these cases. Thus,
while Congress removed guiding language because of a fear of creating a battle of experts, adding the guiding language recommended by
the U.S. Copyright Office will not aggravate the inevitable. It should,
however, provide some framework when courts are presented with all
of the evidence. Because of the current lack of guidance, it is not difficult to imagine that another court could find the 5Pointz defendant’s
expert witness more persuasive because that court could feel a narrower interpretation of VARA is necessary. The guiding language
from the California Art Preservation Act with the addition of the factors described above makes the opinion of the relevant community
tantamount to the opinions of art historians, collectors, curators, and
dealers. This should give courts a greater footing when it comes to
rendering a judgment. It also has the potential of addressing the concern that VARA currently excludes certain types of art that it should
cover.252 By not focusing solely on academic merit, the 5Pointz court
was able to consider the stature of particular graffiti works within the
relevant and appropriate community for that type of art.253 Combining
the guiding language proposed by the U.S. Copyright Office with additional guiding language to define relevant community will give
courts a clearer, more objective framework for making recognized
stature determinations.
Another important development from the 5Pointz litigation is
how succinctly the Second Circuit described the way VARA balances
property owners’ rights with artists’ moral rights. It would be unwise
to discuss the benefits of VARA without touching on the exceptions
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 173.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 6, at 79.
Id.
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carved out in § 113(d)(1)(B). Critics can be quick to conclude that any
moral rights protection interferes and impedes other important rights
such as property rights. However, VARA seeks to balance property
owners’ rights by including specific provisions when an artwork is incorporated within or made part of a building. As explained above, §
113(d)(1)(B) permits the destruction of a work when it is part of a
building so long as the property owner, upon commission of the work,
creates a written instrument that the artist also signs explaining that
the work might be subject to destruction upon removal.254 The provision goes a step further and when a work can be safely removed, the
property owner is to inform and give the artist 90 days to either remove
the work or pay for its removal.255 In other words, § 113(d)(1)(B) limits the rights discussed above allowing an author to prevent the destruction of a work that would harm their honor or reputation or allowing an author to prevent the destruction of a work of recognized stature
if the work in question is incorporated into or made part of a building.256
Proponents of property rights who do not see the value in
moral rights might find these additional requirements encroach upon
property rights. But it is important to recognize the benefits property
owners can acquire when they commission or otherwise allow artwork
to be incorporated within or applied to their buildings. For example,
in 5Pointz, the defendant saw his building become a hub for the
world’s largest collection of aerosol art.257 The defendant had nothing
to do with the daily operations of the site because the plaintiff did the
curating, sought artists, and kept the site clean and safe.258 The site
became a major pop culture attraction drawing thousands of daily visitors and served as the backdrop for Now You See Me, a 2013 movie,
and a concert tour stop by the musician Usher.259 This benefit would
extend to the defendant even after the destruction of the artworks because the defendant stood to benefit economically from the popularity
of the site when he marketed the new luxury residences.260 To allow a
property owner, like the defendant in 5Pointz, to benefit in this way
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B)).
§ 113(d)(2).
§ 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B).
Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441.
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because of the artist without giving the artist any recourse is fundamentally unfair. It assumes that the property owner’s rights are more
significant or important than the artist who made the work that elevated the property site to one of recognized stature. By addressing the
relationship between property owner and artist, VARA seeks to protect the interests of the artist and recognizes that they have rights that
must be acknowledged and balanced with the property owner’s rights.
Although § 113(d)(1)(B) does not change the core of the discussion
regarding interpretation issues and the recognized stature standard, it
is still an important aspect of VARA that must be noted when arguing
that VARA and moral rights have a place within U.S. copyright law.
The Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge brought by
the defendant of the 5Pointz case.261 As a result, a $6.75 million award
to the plaintiffs will stand.262 Additionally, the denial allows the Supreme Court to remain silent on the issue of VARA’s implication on
the First Amendment and on the vagueness of the recognized stature
provision. Although the Court will not speak on the First Amendment
issue in the context of 5Pointz, scholars have proposed different doctrines the Court could employ to analyze VARA’s interaction with the
First Amendment. The first of these doctrines is strict scrutiny. The
government will have to overcome the burden of strict scrutiny by articulating a compelling interest and showing that the regulation is narrowly construed to achieve that interest.263 Additionally, there must
not be any less restrictive means of achieving the governmental
goal.264 If VARA was put under a strict scrutiny review, it would likely
succeed. The government’s interest in passing VARA was to encourage the preservation of cultural heritage, give artists the ability to adequately protect their attribution and integrity interests, and bring the
United States into conformity with the Berne Convention. VARA is
already quite narrow as it only applies to works of visual art,265 of

261. Kyle Jahner, High Court Lets Artists’ $6.75M 5Pointz Graffiti Win Stand,
BLOOMBERG LAW (OCT. 5, 2020, 8:57 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law
/high-court-lets-artists-6-75m-5pointz-graffiti-win-stand [https://perma.cc/TP7C9P5K].
262. Id.
263. Kelly, supra note 141, at 238.
264. Id. at 239.
265. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
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limited quantity,266 and of recognized stature.267 Lastly, it allows artists to waive their rights by contract268 and balances property interests
by allowing property owners to destroy works if they make a diligent
effort to notify artists that their work will be removed or destroyed.269
Any further narrowing would prevent the fulfillment of the statute’s
objectives. The Supreme Court’s denial of the 5Pointz petition creates
an interesting situation for the future of VARA and moral rights in the
United States. The Court’s denial could suggest that it did not find a
persuasive argument in the petitioner’s assertion that VARA violates
the First Amendment. It also denies an opportunity for the Court to
encourage Congress to make amendments to the Act to provide more
guidance. As a result, VARA remains as it was prior to the 5Pointz
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of VARA has led to an array of criticism rooted
in the belief that the doctrine of moral rights cannot coexist with principal tenets of U.S. law. One of these concerns is the tension between
VARA and the First Amendment. Copyright, by default, places some
limitations on the freedom of expression and speech. The Supreme
Court addressed a First Amendment defense in a copyright case, concluding that the fair use defense already took into consideration First
Amendment rights. The tension between VARA and the First Amendment is and will almost certainly be present, but that tension exists to
some extent with much of copyright law. Thus, it should not be used
as a single point of criticism to call for a complete repeal of the Act.
Another concern exemplified in the 5Pointz litigation is the issue of
property rights versus natural rights. This is definitely a fundamental
issue that Congress considered in the writing of VARA, as seen with
the exceptions in § 113(d)(1)(A) for works incorporated into or made
a part of buildings. Again, this tension of competing rights should not
be used as the sole cause to repeal the Act.
VARA serves an extremely important purpose. Through enacting it, Congress recognized artists have interests in securing attribution
266. § 101 (defining a work of visual art as a work in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer signed and consecutively numbered by the author).
267. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
268. § 106A(e).
269. § 113(d).
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for the integrity of their work, and these protections enhance cultural
heritage and promote artistic creation. Additionally, VARA helps promote a public interest goal that is larger than the individual economic
interests of owners and artists. A comprehensive moral rights doctrine
akin to those in France and Germany is likely beyond the scope of
anything that Congress can implement in accordance with U.S. legal
precepts. However, VARA bridges the gap between American and
continental European copyright law by introducing some moral rights
into U.S. copyright law.
Caselaw, in the 31 years since VARA’s enactment, shows the
need for some modifications to give the judiciary a clearer and more
defined framework when interpreting the recognized stature standard
of VARA. Implementing the California Art Preservation Act language, as recommended by the U.S. Copyright Office, would help alleviate interpretation issues, but it would still require further amendments because the language refers to the relevant community. If left
as is, it could continue to cause the same interpretation issues that
courts face today when determining who makes up the relevant community even though the addition of “relevant” begins to create a
clearer framework. The additional guiding language could fall along
the lines of explaining that the relevant community includes a variety
of people interested in or touched by works of art. Implementing the
California Art Preservation Act language and further adding guiding
language to define the relevant community would create a more defined framework and make it clearer to courts, artists, and interested
third parties what works fall under VARA protections. Amending
VARA in this way would help ease some tensions on the courts, which
in turn would ensure VARA is utilized as it was intended: to provide
artists basic fairness and preserving artworks.

